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ABSTRACT
The dominant view in the information technology (IT) strategy literature implicitly or explicitly
incorporates a normative model of dynamic alignment in which business strategy is seen as the primary
driver of strategic adaptation. This paper describes and analyzes a case study of the strategic application
of IT where success emerged via a different process. As well as providing evidence of a path to strategic
fit that is rarely discussed in the literature, the case points to mastery and the management of risk as
critical factors in the process of IT-based strategic change.
1. INTRODUCTION different process that is almost the reverse of these conven-
tional, rational models. In this case, rather than beginning
The strategic management and organization theory litera- with strategy formulation, the process began with a tactical
tures have long held that changes in business strategy and incremental adoption of technology that became the
precede structural adaptation (Chandler 1962; Rumelt 1974; catalyst for a change of individual roles and skills, followed
Donaldson 1987), with the latter driving a re-alignment of by structural adaptation, and, later, changes in the firm's
management processes in the firm (Miles and Snow 1984, management processes, which embedded and reinforced
1992). While there has been some debate around the organizational learning. From this new configuration, a
degree of strategic choice (see Child 1972; Bourgeois business strategy and vision began to emerge as a range of
1984), the view of business strategy as the primary driver new strategic options became apparent In this way, the IT
of organizational adaptation has remained the dominant strategy and subsequent business transformation gradually
paradigm, in both a descriptive and a normative sense. It is evolved out of tactical responses to operational needs. In
also a perspective which has been adopted, implicitly or time, this process came to shape the strategic fit of the
explicitly, by researchers into the strategic management of firm. Thus the case provides evidence of dynamics quite
information technology (IT). For example, the widely cited different to that assumed in much of the IT and more
MIT '9Os framework (Scott Morton 1991), assumes that a general strategic change literature.
firm's business strategy drives the subsequent alignment
and fit of organization structure, management processes, The strategic value of the firm's gradual transformation was
roles and technology. While this IT literature on strategic not a simple direct consequence of the application of IT but
alignment emphasizes that strategy formulation should take a function of the particular interaction of organizational,
account of the potential IT offers to reconfigure the busi- individual and technological factors, for which IT was the
ness (Henderson and Venkatraman 1992; Keen 1991; initial catalyst. This interaction created strategic fit and
McFarlan 1984; Wiseman 1985), it has nevertheless tended embedded processes of learning in the firm. Thus this is a
to adopt the dominant organization theory view about the case study of organizational adaptation and strategic dy-
dynamics of strategic change. namics (Leonard-Barton 1992), in which IT plays a critical
role, rather than a study of diffusion of a technical innova-
We present a case study of the strategic application of tion (Rogers 1983; von Hippel 1988; Cooper and Zmud
information technology where success emerges via a very 1990).
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As well as providing evidence of a little-reported dynamic who left the firm during the study, both before and after his
path to strategic fit and highlighting the role of learning, we resignation. In addition, interviews were conducted with
show how the change process had important implications two clients of the firm to obtain a customer perspective on
for the management of risk. The traditional change model the firm's services. All interviews were conducted in
revolves around a strategic vision and the implementation person by one of the authors, and varied from 45 minutes
of large scale change, which is inherently high risk (Daven- to two hours in duration. Typically, interviews were tape
port 1993). In contrast here, the change process was recorded and transcribed and provide the basis for the
characterized by incremental, sequential, independent steps, quotations below. In the case of the senior design partner,
which minimized threats to the firm by decoupling the risks John Flower, who was the prime mover in the firm's
and spreading them over both different projects and time. gradual transformation, a number of interviews were con-
ducted, totalling over twelve hours. In addition, to obtain a
This paper describes and analyzes these issues: a different comparative view of current architectural practice, practices
dynamic path to strategic fit, adaptation via incremental in other architectural firms were examined, and one of the
learning, and how risks were minimized in the change authors attended an industry seminar on IT in architecture,
process. Of course, generalization from an individual case presented by John Flower.
is obviously limited. Nevertheless, the detailed study of
transformation processes at one firm can be useful, espe-
cially when, as in this instance, research and theory about 2.1 In the Beginning
IT based strategic change are at a formative stage, and
where the research problems are embedded in the particular Over the years, the senior partner, John Flower had periodi-
organizational context and experience of the actors (Benba- cally examined the computer systems available to assist
sat, Goldstein and Mead 1987; Yin 1984; Pettigrew 1989). with architectural design. However, on each occasion, he
Case research is particularly suited to the study of informa- had generally been unimpressed by the expense, size and
lion technology management and change because it pro- complexity of operation of the systems he saw. The trigger
vides the opportunity to analyze in-depth the complex to buy a computer came in 1987, when he lost a design
processes, interactions and interdependencies that charac- competition to a rival. Inquiring as to why his "terrific"
terize the development and implementation of IT-driven design had not won, he was shown his rival's winning
change (Lee 1989). The paper begins with a description of entry - a computerized 3-D "walk-through" of the
how the change process unfolded at Flower and Samios Pty building design. The presentational contrast was dramatic.
Ltd (formerly Flower and Coutts), followed by an analysis As John remarked, "We only had these fluffy little
and discussion of the dynamics of strategic fit achieved at sketches!"
the firm.
I came back and said to my partner at Iliat time:
"That's it - we are getting a computer." So we
2. CASE DESCRI ION went and saw these Macs that a guy had. and i
said "show me how to draw a line," and he went
In 1987, Flower and Samios was a small architectural "click - dick.' ' That basically, was the start of
practice in Sydney, Australia' s largest city, with sixteen it. We were very nervous, because our whole
employees and an annual project portfolio worth $20 to 30 world had been pencils. We bought a Mac II and
million. No computers were used in the business. Within a little Mac SE and some basic programs.
five years, the entire practice had been transformed. By
1992, there were twelve staff, but the annual project portfo- From this hesitant beginning, and as they gained mastery of
lio was over $100 million. Drawing boards and pencils the range of design functions and capabilities, Flower and
were no longer used. Instead, all design work was under- Samios gradually expanded their involvement with compu-
taken on networked Apple Macintosh computers, using a ters until their IT investment reached more than $20,000
range of integrated CAD and multi-media software pack- per employee. Within a few years, the firm's technology
ages. This section of the paper describes how the transfor- platform had become integral to their professional and
mation was initiated, how it evolved, and how has it business success.
changed the business, both internally in terms of manage-
ment structure, roles and processes, and externally, in terms
of relations with clients, suppliers, and competitors. 2.2 Evolution of IT Strategy
While researching the case, we conducted multiple, in-depth Three main elements can now be identified as central in the
interviews with five staff at the firm, including the two evolution of what became Flower and Samios' IT strategy,
senior partners. We also interviewed one staff member although it would be misleading to imply that they reflected
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a consciously planned strategy. First, the principal partners always predominated in decisions about technology. While
agreed that they would learn the new systems. This was the technology became the engine of the business, the
essentially a tactical rather than a strategic decision. John business professionals remained firmly in the driver's seat.
Flower was determined not to repeat what he saw as the As John Flower noted "we are computer-aided architects,
mistake of a colleague elsewhere, who was "held to ran- not CAD operators." With the benefits of accumulated
som" by a CAD computer operator who had become experience with the software and hardware, staff began to
indispensable due to his specialized knowledge. Second, utilize their capabilities more extensively and developed
with experience and increasing mastery over the new skills in moving between packages and integrating pailicu-
technology, John Flower realized that there were cost and lar software components when working on designs and
productivity benefits to be gained from the investment in design presentations.
IT. However, he came to recognize that these could only
be captured if the technology became integral to many The availability of relatively low-cost, high-powered per-
aspects of the business, rather than being marginalized and sonal computers, with sophisticated graphically-based
used for presentations. This required continuing mastery of operating systems and software, significantly lowered the
the systems by the senior partners and the dissemination of risks of the change process for the firm, as did the commit-
that mastery within the practice. This was achieved on a ment to mastery of the systems at all levels of the business.
project-by-project basis, with a staff member being given a This combination of a simple, yet sophisticated, technology
computer at the commencement of a particular job, who platform with continual learning and mastery across the
learned to use the system along with relevant software firm has been a critical part of Flower and Samios' busi-
packages, with help from other staff members who had ness and professional success.
already mastered these. John Flower explained:
Everything was job-based, so we only did it on the 23 How Has IT Changed the Business?
basis of "Here's a new job, its your turn to start
on the machine, and we don't want you using the In effect, Flower and Samios have, over a period of time,
drawing board at all." Each time that happened, used technology to redesign their business processes
we bought a new computer, and the cost of the (Davenport and Short, 1990; Hammer, 1990; Davenport,
acquisition was added to the office cost for that 1993). Internal task and management processes have been
commission. The learning time was also added to transformed, providing increased capacity to focus on
the job costs. This extends the changeover time customer service. Extensive experience with the new
but reduces the risk. Once all of the work stations technologies has led to greater familiarity with complex
were established a file server was added to the design tasks, ease of use, and greater responsiveness to
network, with the network itself being established client needs. The combined effect of the changes has
after the third station was installed. reshaped the firm's strategic position to give them an
apparently sustainable competitive advantage in their
By means of this procedure, and the insistence that staff industry. Flower and Samios have increased their business
"put down their pencils" and master the systems, learning by 400% over the period 1987 to 1992, during a time when
was disseminated throughout the firm. Proceeding gra- local architecture firms have been experiencing a severe
dually, with IT investment costs spread across projects, recession, with a significant proportion of architects in
meant that the investment did not involve large, high risk Sydney being out of work.
bets for the small firm. In addition, with costs absorbed
within the overheads for each project, the demands on Tasks: The design task is simplified to become faster,
scarce capital were contained. more flexible, and more reliable. It is faster because the
powerful CAD systems contain within them much auto-
The third important component was the decision to use only mated specialist knowledge. For example, John Flower
proven, "off-the-shelf' hardware and software systems, commented that, in ninety minutes, he could design a
that were relatively easy to learn and easy to use without complicated roof that an architect who specializes in these
reliance on technical specialists. This was, in fact, critical takes almost a week to complete because of the time
to the achievement of the first two elements presented involved in calculating the complex geometry and com-
above. It was only the availability of such systems that pleting the drawing. In addition, CAD systems allow a
enabled the firm to leverage their business, allowing this number of alternative design ideas to be tested quickly.
technology to become central to the firm's core business One of the staff members at Flower and Samios com-
processes, without the firm becoming dependent upon a mented that initially he was quite skeptical about the
technology they could not understand or operate. In this supposed productivity benefits of the system: "I thought it
way, first professional needs and then business needs was quicker to do manual drawings, but after a few weeks,
147
I was much faster on the computer." The design task is developers with a real-time assessment of the capacity and
more flexible because it allows for easy amendments and income potential of a proposed site through the use of basic
variations, as well as storage and re-use of design compo- site modelling and block modelling on the computer sys-
nents. It is more reliable because the system automatically tem. This enables a developer to make more profitable
ensures that the geometric and other calculations are accu- investment decisions about proposed sites by gaining a
rate. Materials quantities and costs can also be accurately clearer initial picture of the site options. Speed of the full
estimated from the design itself by the software program design process also minimizes interest and site holding
and are automatically updated as designs are amended. costs for property developers because time to market is
reduced.
Customers: Flower and Samios had always been client-
focused. However, innovative use of IT has enhanced their Suppliers: Communication with external specialists is
ability to service their customers by increasing the flexibi- increasingly electronic. Instead of passing reams of large,
lity of customization, reducing time to completion, and detailed paper plans between offices, computer disks are
improving the range of value-added customer services the exchanged with quantity surveyors, structural engineering
firm can offer. These have been achieved with presentation specialists, and photographic or publishing shops. Com-
technology that maximizes client understanding of particu- munication by modem is also now an option. This signifi-
lai design functions and alternatives, facilitating meaningful cantly reduces inter-organizational errors, communication
and direct client involvement and feedback on the design costs and response time. Operationally, it has many of the
process. This leads to considerable increases in customer characteristics of a just-in-time system among a network of
satisfaction at relatively low cost professional service firms.
As developments such as multimedia integration occur, the The close relationships that Flower and Samios have
firm has been able to adapt and utilize these advances to established with hardware and software suppliers means
improve client service. For example, a "movie" of a new that they are kept well informed of new developments and
design in its planned location can be presented on screen, are even considered a partner in trailing new ways of
utilizing scanned photographic or video images of the site, working with the technology by some specialized software
integrated with 3-D images of the planned development. development houses. Periodically they will hold internal
Internal "walkthroughs" of the buildings, with light, workshops to share their learning, in which the technology
shadows and views accurately simulated for the actual site, suppliers often participate. This reinforces and sustains
provide the client with an easily understood and far more their prime mover position.
detailed picture of the consequences of the design than is
possible with usual two dimensional images of architectural lIndividuals and roles: Dramatic changes to traditional
sketches. The firm thus uses and integrates video captur- architectural and drafting roles, in relation to the transition
ing, photo-realistic rendering and photo montaging in its from pencils and drawing boards to computer screens and
computer-based design presentations. This ease of demon- mouse technology, have been mentioned above. These
stration has also meant that the firm is well placed to meet changes have meant that one person can now take responsi-
the increasing local government council requirements for bility for a greater proportion of a project, using the com-
community participation and comment on proposed devel- puter to design, detail, estimate and schedule the project,
opments. This can be achieved by projecting such 3-D with less dependence on draftspersons and external special-
"movies" of the design-in-location on large video screens ists. In terms of staffmg policy, Flower and Samios have
in public meetings, which helps interested parties to gain a also moved away from the conventional architectural
clearer picture of the proposed outcome. The associated model, whereby students, new graduates and specialist
business benefit from this is that the greater clarity and draftspersons were employed to undertake various tasks in
improved communication reduces controversy and conflict the design process. Now, they only employ people who are
and lessens the risk of expensive litigation in the Land and experienced architects and train them to use the computer
Environment Court. As one major client who had been technology. This staffing policy has potentially important
through the community participation process commented, implications for the profession that are discussed later in
"John's presentation to the public meeting was sensational. the paper.
People can't read plans, so this made it much easier for
them to understand, and they were thus less fearful and Just how integral the IT platform is to the work of the firm,
antagonistic. It was also easier to answer their questions." and how the roles have changed, was illustrated by a staff
appointment. While the individual was a competent archi-
Another example of the contribution of IT to the firm' s tect, he found it difficult to move away from his traditional
client responsiveness is the capacity to provide property skill base. Essentially, he was unwilling to surrender his
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traditional bases of expertise - skill at creating design organizational configuration in which all elements are in
sketches on paper and the speed and quality of his drafts- tight strategic fit.
manship - and to invest the necessary effort to master the
computer systems. He commented that while CAD tech- In addition, many architects appear to be resisting changing
nology had a useful role to play, he believed it should not their traditional work practices and remain attached to the
dominate the architectural process: "It is easier to do the image of the architect as an artist, who sketches a design in
early, rough conceptual sketches on paper, and then use pencil and hands it over to draftspeople to complete the
CAD to formalize it later, to get all the dimensions and formal drawings. Some believe that using a computer, with
documentation right. The broad-brush, creative side of the its straight lines and fixed measurements, somehow reduces
process is more suited to rough hand sketches." By this the creativity of the architect. John Flower commented
stage in the evolution of the practice' s IT strategy, the that:
firm's partners required the development of mastery of the
technology in all staff. Because of his misfit with Flower There is a lot of resistance to this stuff in our
and Samios' commitment to a fully IT-based practice, the industry: "We are artistic and creative, we don't
new appointee left the firm after a few months. get held to ransom by machines" - a lot of
that...Most of our competitors are quite senior in
Competitors: The centrality of IT to Flower and Samios' the business„„ they are well established firms who
operations is quite distinctive within the architecture profes- have got enormous credentials and really aren't
sion in Australia. It is undoubtedly one of the reasons they interested in computers. They have come from
have been able to grow, even during economic recession. another time, and they really see no need to
Field research and anecdotal evidence suggest that within change.
the industry, IT is seen primarily as CAD, or a means for
automating some existing work. Most of the large practices
have substantial, often mainframe-based, IT systems, 3. DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC FIT
typically operated as a separate department with CAD
specialists. Alternatively, one or two more junior staff are It is instructive to consider how Flower and Samios'
given the CAD systems to learn, and are then used as competitive advantage evolved, in order to understand the
technicians. For example, when walking around a large dynamics by which strategic fit was achieved. The poten-
architecture firm with one of its senior partners, one of the tial of IT to support or shape the competitive strategy of an
authors asked him how a particular system worked. The organization is widely argued, advocated and believed
partner did not know and called on a junior designer to (Keen 1991; McFarlan 1984; Wiseman 1985), and just as
give a demonstration. This behavior ensures that organiza- widely recognized as difficult to translate into reality
tional learning and experience with the systems remains (Chew, Leonard-Barton and Bohm 1991; Kemerer and Sosa
limited, the technology is marginalized, and its strategic 1991). This firm now clearly exhibits strategic fit: what
opportunities are not realized. Miles and Snow (1984, p.15) described as "convergence on
a set of core business values - doing what one does best
This was reinforced at a recent architect' s association a lean action-oriented structure that provides opportunities
seminar on IT presented by John Flower and attended by for the full use of people's capabilities at all levels." As
one of the authors. Over eighty professionals participated they describe it, this gestalt within the firm is now so
in the seminar, including partners from a number of major obvious and compelling that complex organizational and
architecture firms, and the presentation generated many managerial demands appear to be simple. This simplicity
questions and considerable audience involvement. How- leads to widespread understanding that reinforces and
ever, the questions were essentially tactical, rather than sustains fit. The structure and key management processes
strategic ("Can you automate?" rather than "How does teach staff the appropriate attitudes and behaviors for
this change our business?"). Discussion at the seminar maintaining focus on strategic requirements (Miles and
suggested that the understanding most architects have of the Snow 1984).
application of IT in the industry is at the "automate" stage.
However, Flower and Samios' incorporation of IT into their In order to understand how this fit is achieved, we need a
business has evolved well beyond this to the "transforma- dynamic model of strategic change. The most frequently
tion" stage. For instance, a couple of architects the authors cited model of strategic alignment adapted from tile MIT
spoke to made comments such as "we've got computers, '9Os framework (Scott Morton 1991), is set out in Figure 1.
but we can't do what John does with his." For Flower and While all elements of the model are shown as interdepen-
Samios, the technology has become integral to all of their dent, what is needed is a dynamic model of the process by
fundamental business processes and a key component of an which this alignment is achieved. Most descriptions of fit
149
Figure 1. A Model or Strategic Change and Fit Figure 2. Conventional Model of Strategic Dynamics
(Adapted from Scott Morton 1991)
Structure
2
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Individuals i /and Roles Individualsand RolesExternal Environment
in the IT strategy literature tell us little about the path to Here, in response to a perceived threat, the initial interven-
fit. However, they tend to assume, often implicitly, that tion was at the level of technology, followed by a transfor-
this is a world defined and driven by the business strategy mation of individual skills and roles, then changes in
of the firm. For instance, Scott Morton (1991, p.20) structure, and the subsequent alignment and integration of
comments that management processes. The clarification of strategic
intent, and insights into the strategic drivers of this new
none of the potentially beneficial enabling aspects configuration, only occurred after the initial organizational
of IT can take place without clarity of business gestalt was in place. The strategic vision grew out of the
purpose and a vision of what the organization implementation. However, this is not to suggest that,
should become„„when the issue at hand is organi- because it does not follow the rational model, this process
zational transformation, enabled by technology, it is somehow inappropriate. In fact, this case may help us to
appears particularly important to invest a large understand the dynamics of fit: suggesting evidence for
amount of time and effort in getting the organiza- how fit can actually be achieved.
tion to understand where it is going and why.
The initial action to implement new technology in Flower
This implicit conventional path to fit is shown in Figure 2. and Samios was taken in response to an immediate threat:
a design competition was lost apparently because of the
The traditional theoretical argument is that a firm devises superior design presentation technology of the competitor.
the strategy, chooses the structure and management pro- Once introduced, the first impact of the technology within
cesses that fit it, aligns IT and ensures that individuals are the firm was at the level of individual skills and roles: first
appropriately trained and that roles are well designed (Miles the partners mastered the systems and then trained the staff
and Snow 1984, 1992; Scott Morton 1991). While for the on the systems, gradually but comprehensively, on a project
most part, the organization theory literature is inconclusive by project basis. Importantly, all staff had to master the
about whether this sequence is descriptive or normative, the systems and give up their old drawing skills as they moved
IT strategic change literature takes a normative approach. onto using the computers. Roles changed to encompass
However, the sequence we observe in Flower and Samios' greater scope and one architect could more easily "own" a
progression to fit is not the sequence that is implied or particular project.
stated in the literature. Their dynamic path can be repre-
sented by Figure 3. Once fully implemented at the individual level, the structure
of the firm was changed to reflect the changing skills and
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Figure 3. Strategic Dynamics at Flower and San:ios It could be argued that this scenario is quite consistent with
the models in the IT strategy literature that advocate formu-
lating strategy in light of the potential of information
Su·uctltre technology (Davenport and Short 1990; Keen 1991).
However, most of these writers take as given, if not recom-
mend, that the process should be deliberate, planned and
logically phased. Venkatraman (1991), for example, writes
"an organization cannot just choose to implement,
without any planning, a particular piece of technology.
Research has shown that it must do so in context, that it
5  - 4 1 must consciously align its business strategy and its organi-
- zation with its technology." In contrast, the evidence of
Strategy Flower and Samios suggests that while strategic fit did
Management Technology
Processes
occur, it was not consciously planned, but emerged out of
an incremental, tactical implementation of technology,
which in interaction with the organizational factors dis-
cussed above, gradually transformed the business. While
2 the literature on the nature of competitive advantage and
Individuals the role of IT may be used to explain why Flower and
and Roles Samios have been successful, it does not explain the dy-
namics of their behavior.
work practices. The traditional division of labor between This evidence is consistent with the widespread criticism of
architects, draftspersons and student "apprentices" was no rational models of behavior in organizations, including
longer necessary. Reduced staffing needs meant that cost strategy formation (Burgelman 1983; Lindblom 1959;
reductions were realized. With fewer staff and no drawing Mintzberg 1991; Quinn 1980; March and Olsen 1976;
boards, the structure in effect became flatter, with greater Weick 1987). When organization change occurs, interpreta-
delegation to the more highly skilled staff. In addition, less tion of the firm's external environment may be based on
office space was required. Over time, management and real or perceived problems, and will not necessarily reflect
control processes were also adjusted to integrate the work market forces or perfect rationality (Fligstein 1985). John
processes. As the number of machines grew, a local area Flower was the principal actor in this change process and,
network and a file server were installed to facilitate com- as senior partner in a small firm, was in a position to
munication and file transfer within the practice. Materials enforce his solution in the organization. He constructed a
specifications and costing programs, as well as project set of problems that were of particular concern to him
management and accounting, and electronic mail began to personally, worked out a set of solutions that few others in
be utilized within the technology platform. the industry were using, and gave importance to imple-
menting them. The outcome has been a strategic advantage
The awareness of the strategic importance of tile firm's that was not originally envisaged. The dynamic has more
experience and skills with the technology platform, and resonance with Weick's claim that it is what managers do,
how it opened up opportunities for creating value-added not what they plan, that explains their success. Here,
client services, developed out of this initial application and strategy is portrayed as an emergent rather than a rational
integration of technology into the organization, rather than process (Mintzberg 1991), involving small steps that gradu-
preceding il. In effect, once the new organizational gestalt ally foreclose alternative courses of action and limit what is
was in place, the implicit strategic drivers could be assessed possible. The case exemplifies Cyert and March's (1963)
and decisions made as to which of those drivers to make analysis of organizational decision making under uncer-
the focus of future developments. Upon analysis, it could tainty, in which it is argued that potentially complex prob-
be seen that the technology not only enabled lower-cost lems get decomposed into a series of tactical, sequential,
operations, but more importantly that mastery enabled the decisions. At each incremental step, learning occurs, which
creation of competitive advantage through the provision of creates an awareness of different opportunities for action,
high quality. timely, and unique customer service. Flower which in turn affects the next step taken. Thus, it is not
and Samios are now becoming aware of how these value- rational, planned strategies, but the interplay of small-scale,
added services differentiate them from their competitors and tactical decision making with ongoing experience that
form the basis of their distinctive competence. shapes outcomes.
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Ciborra (1991) provides a rare example of the application and social interactions shape the uses and consequences of
of this type of analysis in the IT strategy literature. He IT as Markus and Robey do, we focus on the how the
points out how the classic cases of strategic information specific business context, management processes, structure,
systems such as Baxter's ASAP, American Airline's and individual roles and skills, interact with the incremental
SABRE, and France's Minitel gradually evolved from adoption of technology to shape the strategic intent of the
localized responses to particular operational problems or firm in an emergent fashion.
customer needs, rather than being created out of grand
strategic designs. Ciborra comments that "incrementalism, The case is also consistent with calls for mixing levels of
muddling through, myopic, and evolutionary decision analysis in interdisciplinary research, where the phenomena
making processes seem to prevail, even when there is a studied inevitably involve multiple levels: individual,
formal adherence [to rational models of strategy forma- organizational and environmental (Markus and Robey 1988;
tion]" (p. 285). As we have seen, his comments certainly Rousseau 1985). Here, the learning and adaptation occurs
apply to Flower and Samios. Ciborra also suggests that initially at the individual level, affecting skills and roles,
this incremental and evolutionary organizational learning which leads to structural changes in the firm. Management
can form the basis of a sustainable competitive advantage processes then change to reinforce and institutionalize the
for a firm, where the innovation is embedded in and new ways of working, with awareness of strategic oppor-
emerges from a unique set of conditions and experience tunities generated by the change process developing gradu-
that is not easily replicated (see also Leonard-Barton 1992). ally over time. It is this dynamic interdependence among
Flower and Samios provide a good example of this. factors at different levels of analysis that creates the tight
Although the hardware and software are readily available, fit for the firm. The embedding of the new learning and
the successful application of IT in their business emerges work practices in management processes again affects the
from the firm's unique body of learning and experience, individual level. For example, all new staff are now
and how they have integrated IT into their core business appointed on the condition that they will master the IT
processes. systems. However, one new appointee, who was otherwise
very competent, failed to adapt to these different work
These views of the evolution of strategic fit differ signifi- requirements and subsequently left the firm.
cantly from the assumptions about dynamics that charac-
terize the general literature on fit, as well as most literature The changes in the firm's staffing requirements could have
on IT management and strategic change. In particular, significant implications for the industry generally, if other
rather than being aligned with strategies, structures and firms follow their lead. Flower and Samios no longer
management processes, IT is often embedded within the employ new architectural graduates. Formerly, graduates
evolution of these very elements. This challenges the were hired to handle the drafting and documentation work-
notion that the critical issue in managing IT successfully is load generated by the skilled design professionals. In doing
alignment. The current dominant design in IT is to align so, they undertook an "apprenticeship" in the firm, being
the IT strategy and structure with the business strategy and gradually trained in the practical skills of the profession.
structure (Scott Morton 1991; Henderson and Venkatraman This was an efficient solution for Flower and Samios, as it
1992). The word "alignment" itself is widely accepted in allowed the experienced staff to focus on high value-added
the existing literature, and frequently occurs in the title of work. Now, it is considered to be inefficient to employ
articles. We would argue that in this, and a limited number inexperienced graduates, because the computers have
of other cases in which we have observed successful absorbed much of the more mundane work of documenta-
organizational transformation, IT is a central component in tion and drafting. Furthermore, the firm has found that it is
strategic change, and is embedded in core businesses less costly for the firm to employ an experienced architect
processes, rather than being "folded around," or aligned who is willing to work with computers (and many now
with, the prevailing configuration (Yetton and Johnston have had some prior exposure to CAD) than to wait a few
1993). years while they bring a new graduate "up to speed" in
architectural design. Over time, if this technology becomes
This is not to argue for a "technological imperative" central to the core business of many other firms, the profes-
(Markus and Robey 1988) in explaining the change process. sion could confront a real dilemma around how it trains,
Instead, it was only out of the dynamic interaction of recruits and develops its new members.
individual, organizational, technological and strategic
factors that the outcomes emerged as they did for Flower The experience of Flower and Samios also suggests that the
and Samios. Thus, our analysis here is closer to Markus management of risk made an important contribution to the
and Robey' s "emergent perspective." The difference is effectiveness of the change process. Each step in the
that, instead of emphasizing how general social processes creation of their organizational configuration was achieved
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incrementally and involved essentially low risk actions, strategic application of the technology platform. The
anchored in particular client projects, rather than being experience of Flower and Samios in implementing informa-
dramatic or expensive shifts of focus. Each change imple- tion technology may generalize to other professional organi-
mented was job or project based, and thus closely tied to zations. However, it is a small firm and so does not face
the customer, rather than being large-scale or driven by the range of coordination and control issues that are critical
fascination with the technology itself. At each stage of the for larger organizations. Nor does it face the same level of
process, no high risk action, which might have jeopardized system complexity as that faced by many large manufactur-
the transition, was required. The change process, from ing and service organizations. Nevertheless, Flower and
individual learning, through cost efficiencies, integration, Samios is an exemplar case of the successful application of
and articulation of the strategy, evolved gradually. Being IT, where this application has become an integral part of
new to computers meant that the firm had no history of the strategic focus and managerial processes of the organi-
incompatible systems to manage and an integrated platform zation. The IT strategy is not "aligned with" the business
was "simply" grown by restricting the hardware and strategy; it is now an essential component of, and insepar-
software to systems that could communicate easily with able from, that business strategy. At the same time, the
each other. technology systems do not provide any competitive advan-
tage on their own: it is the organizational gestalt in which
What Flower and Samios effectively achieved was a parti- the technology is embedded, its consistent strategic applica-
tioning of the total risk of the transformation into a series tion, and the focus on learning and mastery within the firm
of smaller, manageable risks, so that at any one time, the that create competitive advantage.
threat to the business from the change process was low.
By spreading risks over time, and dealing with them se-
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